






Roger White (2015) sketches an ingenious new solution to the problem of induction. He                           
argues from the principle of indiﬀerence for the conclusion that the world is more likely                             
to be induction‑friendly than induction‑unfriendly. But there is reason to be skeptical                       
about the proposed indiﬀerence‑based vindication of induction. It can be shown that, in                         
the crucial test cases White concentrates on, the assumption of indiﬀerence renders                       
induction no more accurate than random guessing. After discussing this result, the                       
paper explains why the indiﬀerence‑based argument seemed so compelling, despite                   
ultimately  being  unsound. 
Roger White (2015) sketches an ingenious new solution to the problem of induction,                         
arguing on  a priori grounds that the world is more likely to be induction‑friendly than                             
induction‑unfriendly. The argument relies primarily on the principle of indiﬀerence,                   
and, somewhat surprisingly, assumes li le else. If inductive methods could be                     
vindicated in anything like this way, it would be quite a groundbreaking result. But                           
there are grounds for pessimism about the argument. It can be shown that, in the crucial                               
test cases White concentrates on, the assumption of indiﬀerence renders induction no                       
more accurate than random guessing. After discussing this result, we then explain why                         
the indiﬀerence‑based argument seemed so compelling, despite ultimately being                 
unsound. 
1.  AN  INDIFFERENCE‑BASED  STRATEGY 
White begins by imagining that we are “apprentice demons” tasked with devising an                         
induction‑unfriendly world – a world where inductive methods tend to be unreliable. To                         
simplify, we imagine that there is a single binary variable that we control (such as                             
whether the sun rises over a series of consecutive days). So, in essence, the task is to                                 




an inductive reasoner would fare poorly at predicting its future bits. This task, it turns                             
out, is surprisingly diﬃcult. To see this, it will be instructive to consider several possible                             
strategies  for  constructing  a  sequence  that  would  frustrate  an  ideal  inductive  predictor. 





Sequences like these are quite kind to induction. Our inductive reasoner would quickly                         
latch onto the obvious pa erns these sequences exhibit. A more promising approach, it                         
might  seem,  is  to  build  an  apparently  pa ernless  sequence: 
00101010011111000011100010010100 
But, importantly, while induction will not be particularly  reliable at predicting the terms                         
of this sequence, it will not be particularly  unreliable here either. Induction would                         
simply be silent about what a sequence like this contains. As White puts it, “ In order                                 
for... induction to be applied, our data must contain a salient regularity of a reasonable                             
length” (p. 285). When no pa ern whatsoever can be discerned, presumably, induction                       
is silent. (We will assume that the inductive predictor is permi ed to suspend judgment                           
whenever she wishes.) The original aim was not to produce an induction‑neutral                       
sequence, but to produce a sequence that elicits errors from induction. So an entirely                           
pa ernless sequence will not suﬃce. Instead, the induction‑unfriendly sequence will                   






Of course, this precise sequence is relatively friendly to induction. While our inductive                         
predictor will undoubtedly botch her prediction of the ﬁnal bit, it is clear that she will                               
be able to amass a long string of successes prior to that point. So, on balance, the above                                   
sequence  is  quite  kind  to  induction  –  though  not  maximally  so.  
In order to render induction unreliable, we will need to elicit more errors than                           
correct  predictions.  We  might  try  to  achieve  this  as  follows: 
00001111000011110000111100001111 
The idea here is to oﬀer up just enough of a pa ern to warrant an inductive prediction,                                 
before pulling the rug out – and then to repeat the same trick again and again. Of                                 
course, this precise sequence would not necessarily be the way to render induction                         
unreliable: For, even if we did manage to elicit an error or two from our inductive                               
predictor early on, it seems clear that she would eventually catch on to the exceptionless                             
higher‑order  pa ern  governing  the  behavior  of  the  sequence. 
The upshot of these observations is not that constructing an induction‑unfriendly                     
sequence is impossible. As White points out, constructing such a sequence should be                         
possible, given any complete description of how exactly induction works (p. 287).                       
Nonetheless, even if there are a few special sequences that can frustrate induction, it                           
seems clear that such sequences are fairly few and far between. In contrast, it is                             
obviously very easy to  corroborate induction (i.e. to construct a sequence rendering it                         
thoroughly reliable). So induction is relatively  un‑frustrate‑able.  And it is worth noting                       




method based on the gambler’s fallacy, which advises one to predict whichever                       
outcome has occurred less often, overall. It would be quite easy to frustrate this method                             
thoroughly  (e.g.  ‘00000000…’ ).  
So far, we have identiﬁed a highly suggestive feature of induction. To put things                           
roughly,  it  can  seem  that:  
*  Over  a  large  number  of  sequences,  induction  is  thoroughly  reliable. 
* Over a large number of sequences, induction is silent (and hence, neither reliable nor                             
unreliable). 
* Over a very small number of sequences (i.e. those speciﬁcally designed to thwart                           
induction), induction is unreliable (though, even in these cases, induction is still silent much                           
of  the  time). 
Viewed from this angle, it can seem reasonable to conclude that there are  a priori                             
grounds for conﬁdence that an arbitrary sequence is not induction‑unfriendly. After all,                       
there seem to be far  more induction‑friendly sequences than induction‑unfriendly ones.                     
If we assign equal probability to every possible sequence, then the probability that an                           
arbitrary sequence will be induction‑friendly is going to be signiﬁcantly higher than the                         
probability that it will be induction‑unfriendly. So a simple appeal to the principle of                           
indiﬀerence seems to generate the happy verdict that induction can be expected to be                           
more  reliable  than  not,  at  least  in  the  case  of  binary  sequences.  
Moreover, as White points out, the general strategy is not limited to binary                         
sequences. If we can show  a priori that induction over a binary sequence is unlikely to be                                 
induction‑unfriendly, then it’s plausible that a similar kind of argument can be used to                           






However, there are grounds for pessimism about whether the strategy is successful –                         
even in the simple case of binary sequences. Suppose that, as a special promotion, a                             
casino decided to oﬀer  Fair Roule e . The game involves be ing $1 on a particular color –                               
black or red – and then spinning a wheel, which is entirely half red and half black. If                                   
wrong, you lose your dollar; if right, you get your dollar back and gain another. If it                                 
were really true that induction can be expected to be more reliable than not over binary                               
sequences, it would seem to follow that induction can serve as a winning strategy, over                             
the long term, in Fair Roule e. After all, multiple spins of the wheel produce a binary                               
sequence of reds and blacks. And all possible sequences are equally probable. Of                         
course, induction cannot be used to win at Fair Roule e – past occurrences of red, for                               
example, are not evidence that the next spin is more likely to be red. This suggests that                                 
something is amiss. Indeed, it turns out that no inferential method – whether inductive                           
or otherwise – can possibly be expected to be reliable at predicting unseen bits of a                               
binary  sequence,  if  the  principle  of  indiﬀerence  is  assumed.  1




1 This fact is a direct consequence of Wolpert’s (1996, p. 1354) “No Free Lunch” theorem, which,                                 
among other things, places limits on the expected accuracy of computable predictive functions, given                           
certain assumptions about the relative probabilities of diﬀerent occurrences and given certain other                         
assumptions about how predictive functions are scored. The theorem and its proof are complicated. Here,                             
we provide a relatively straightforward argument for a claim that turns out to be an immediate corollary.                                 






Let  f be an arbitrary predictive function that takes as input any initial subsequence of  S                               
and  outputs  a  prediction  for  the  next  bit:  ‘ 0 ’,  ‘ 1 ’,  or  ‘ suspend  judgment ’.  
A predictive function’s accuracy is measured as follows: +1 for each correct                       
prediction; –1 for each incorrect prediction; 0 each time ‘suspend judgment’ occurs. (So                         
the maximum accuracy of a function is  n ; the minimum score is – n .) Given a probability                               
distribution over all possible sequences, the  expected accuracy of a predictive function is                         
the  average  of  its  possible  scores  weighted  by  their  respective  probabilities.  
We now arrive at an important fact:  If we assume indiﬀerence (i.e. if we assign equal                               
probability to every possible sequence), then – no ma er what  S is – each of f ’s                               
predictions  will be expected to contribute 0 to  f ’s accuracy; and as a result,  f has 0                                 
expected  accuracy,  generally. 
This fact can be shown as follows.  For some initial subsequences,  f will output ‘suspend                             
judgment’. The contribution of such predictions will inevitably be 0. So we need                         
consider only those cases where  f makes a ﬁrm prediction (i.e. ‘0’ or ‘1’; not ‘suspend                               
judgment’). 











Consider the full sequences that begin with  K and for which the prediction is correct.                             
These sequences begin with  K and have ‘ 1 ’ in position  k  + 1. There are 2 n –  ( k + 1) of these                                           
sequences, since there are 2 n –  ( k + 1) ways that this sequence could terminate. But there are                                   
also exactly 2 n –  ( k + 1) sequences beginning with  K  where ‘1’ is  not in position  k+ 1. (For                                     
these  sequences,  ‘ 0 ’  is  in  position  k  +  1  instead.)   
So the number of possible sequences that make the prediction correct is equal to the                             
number that make it incorrect. Given indiﬀerence, the probability of a correct prediction                         
and the probability of an incorrect prediction both equal .5, which makes the expected                           
contribution  of  this  prediction  0. 
Of course, the same reasoning would apply equally if  f’ s prediction were ‘ 0 ’ instead                           
of ‘ 1 ’. Indeed, the reasoning generalizes to all of  f ’s predictions. So the expected                           
contribution of every prediction is 0. It follows immediately that  f ’s expected accuracy is                           
0. The upshot is that if indiﬀerence is assumed, then there is absolutely no method,                             
inductive or otherwise, for predicting the unseen bits of a binary sequence that can be                             
expected to perform reliably. In fact, the principle of indiﬀerence actually  precludes                       
induction  from  being  expectedly  accurate. 
3.  A  DIAGNOSIS 
We have seen that the indiﬀerence‑based strategy does not work for binary sequences.                         
What, then, is so a ractive about it? At least intuitively, it seems right to claim that it is                                   
diﬃcult to construct a binary sequence on which induction is consistently unreliable. At                         
best, we can construct sequences on which induction rarely hazards any guesses at all,                           




other hand, we saw that it is easy to construct sequences on which induction is wildly                               
successful.  How  can  these  observations  be  squared  with  the  result  from  §2? 
The answer has to do with the nature of the inductive method. Induction takes its                             
own past record of success and failure as evidence for future predictions. If the past has                               
been unkind to induction, then induction will be loath to make further predictions.                         
Confronted with its own past failures , induction is unwilling to stick its neck out again                             
– in this sense, we might say that induction is  shy . This explains why it is so hard to ﬁnd                                       
binary sequences on which induction is consistently unreliable. Once induction begins                     
to exhibit unreliability, it will stop making predictions at all. On the other hand,                           
induction is especially willing to continue making predictions in the face of past                         
success. Thus, it is easy to construct the sequences on which induction is consistently                           
reliable. 
Shyness, however, is not a property that is unique to inductive prediction. And,                         
crucially, shyness is in no way evidence of the reliability of a predictive method. To                             
illustrate,  consider  the  following  predictive  method: 
Fool Me Once (FMO) : Continue predicting ‘ 0 ’ until ‘ 1 ’ occurs. Then suspend judgment for                           
all  subsequent  bits. 
FMO is quite shy – one of the shyest methods possible. As long as its predictions                               
continue to be conﬁrmed, it will continue to recommend ﬁrm predictions. But as soon as                             
it issues a single false prediction, it forever retires from the game, staying silent for the                               
rest  of  the  sequence  no  ma er  what  happens. 
Importantly, FMO has the very same characteristics that the indiﬀerence‑based                   




construct an FMO‑unfriendly sequence – a sequence that renders FMO consistently                     
unreliable. At most, we can elicit one false prediction and no true ones. On the other                               
hand, it is easy to construct sequences that render FMO very successful: Any sequence                           
that begins with a long string of ‘ 0 ’s will ensure that FMO ends up with a relatively                                 
high  accuracy  score. 
So, as with induction, it is in some sense easier to construct a FMO‑friendly sequence                             
than a FMO‑unfriendly sequence. This suggests that this shyness is the feature of                         
induction the indiﬀerence‑based strategy relied upon. After all, shyness is the deﬁning                       
characteristic – and, perhaps, the only characteristic – of FMO as a predictive method. It                             
takes shyness to the extreme – even a single false prediction is indefeasible reason to                             
give up making predictions all together – and does nothing else. The mere fact that a                               
predictive method is shy, however, gives us no reason to expect the method to be                             
reliable – at least, if indiﬀerence is assumed. Of course, this is a consequence of the                               
result shown in  §2 – since no methods can be expected to be reliable whatsoever. But it                                 
may be helpful to see why FMO turns out not to be reliable. Doing so will help to                                   
illustrate  what  was  so  appealing  about  the  indiﬀerence‑based  argument. 
Consider an unknown binary sequence of length  n . FMO continues making                     
predictions until the ﬁrst ‘ 1 ’ occurs, at which point, FMO falls silent. To begin, consider                             
those sequences that begin with ‘ 1 ’. Since these cases comprise half of all possible                           
sequences, the probability of such a sequence’s occurrence is .5 (via indiﬀerence). In                         
these cases, FMO’s score will be –1. Next, consider those sequences that have an initial                             




cases FMO’s score will be 0. Consider those sequences that begin with two ‘ 0 ’s,                           
followed by a ‘ 1 ’. The probability of such a sequence’s occurrence is .125, and in these                               
cases  FMO’s  score  will  be  ‑1. 
A  pa ern  emerges.  FMO’s  expected  accuracy  will  be:  2
.5)( ) .25)(0) .125)(+ ) .06125)(+ ) 1 2 )(n ) 1 2 )(n)  ( 1 + ( + ( 1 + ( 2 +… + ( / n 2 + ( / n  
Ultimately,  FMO’s  expected  accuracy  on  S  is: 
 (1 2 )(k ) 1 2 )(n)  Σnk=1 / k
 
2 + ( / n = 0
Here we can see what is wrong with the indiﬀerence‑based argument. Though there are                           
no possible sequences on which FMO is consistently unreliable, there are a large                         
number of sequences on which FMO is ever‑so‑slightly unreliable – indeed, these                       
sequences comprise half of all possible sequences. These cases balance out the                       
comparatively few sequences on which FMO is reliable – including the small number                         
on  which  FMO  is  highly  reliable. 
An analogous point seems to hold for induction, although the details will depend on                           
the speciﬁc predictive rule that is taken to constitute inductive reasoning. For                       
illustrative purposes, consider the simple rule which predicts that the next bit will be                           
whichever digit has occurred most often – ignoring where in the sequence those digits have                             
occurred (e.g. so if the sequence so far is ‘ 0001 ’, then our inductive rule predicts that ‘ 0 ’                                 
will occur next). When the sequence contains equally many occurrences of ‘ 0 ’ and ‘ 1 ’,                           
no prediction is made. This rule, it should be noted, has much in common with                             
induction: It relies on a version of the assumption that what has happened will continue                             





to happen. And, like induction, it is somewhat shy: enough mistakes will make the rule                             
fall silent (since each mistake brings the sequence closer to a perfect balance of ‘0’s and                               
‘1’s),  while  a  string  of  success  will  ensure  that  the  rule  continues  to  make  predictions. 
Suppose that a sequence of only ﬁve bits is to be revealed one bit at a time. And                                   









First, we should note that there are a few sequences that make our rule massively                             
successful: The sequences ‘ 00000 ’ and ‘ 11111 ’ both lead to the very high score of +4 for                               
our rule. And we should note that there are no sequences that frustrate our rule to the                                 
same degree: –2 is the lowest possible score our rule can ever earn. But in terms of                                 
quantity, there are  more unfriendly sequences than friendly ones, by a count of 16 to 12.                               
As was the case with FMO, the quantity of (somewhat) unfriendly sequences makes up                           
for  the  discrepancy  between  the  best  case  and  the  worst  cases. 
So, where has the indiﬀerence‑based argument gone wrong? The argument rests on                       
the claims that there were many sequences friendly to induction, and comparatively                       
few that were unfriendly. There are two ways to interpret these claims. If a sequence is                               
“friendly” to induction just in case it elicits predictions from induction that would earn                           




false. But, more interestingly, if a sequence is “friendly” to induction just in case it elicits                               
predictions from induction that would earn a  very high positive score (with “unfriendly”                         
deﬁned correspondingly), then the claims are true – but irrelevant to the expected                         
accuracy of induction. For any shy method will have this property, and many shy                           
methods  are  not  particularly  reliable. 
4.  CONCLUSION 
Many proposed solutions to the problem of induction require us to have some  a priori                             
basis for assuming that the world is uniform in a way that makes it amenable to                               
induction. Such solutions are somewhat unsatisfying, as it can be mysterious how we                         
are warranted in making such assumptions. An  a priori vindication of inductive                       
methods that relies solely on the principle of indiﬀerence would address this worry,                         
insofar as the principle more naturally admits of  a priori justiﬁcation. We have seen,                           
however, that the indiﬀerence‑based vindication of induction mistakes shyness for                   
accuracy. So it may be that, in our eﬀort to solve the problem of induction, we are stuck                                   
with  a  certain  degree  of  mystery.  3
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